We impose the axiom Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives on division rules for the conflicting claims problem. With the addition of Consistency and Resource Monotonicity, this characterizes a family of rules which can be described in three different but intuitive ways. First, a rule is identified with a fixed monotone path in the space of awards, and for a given claims vector, the path of awards for that claims vector is simply the monotone path truncated by the claims vector. Second, a rule is identified with a set of parametric functions indexed by the claimants, and for a given claims problem, each claimant receives the value of his parametric function at a common parameter value, but truncated by his claim. Third, a rule is identified with an additively separable, strictly concave social welfare function, and for a given claims problem, the amount awarded is the maximizer of the social welfare function subject to the constraint of choosing a feasible award. This third way of describing the family of rules is similar to Lensberg's (1987) solution for bargaining problems applied to conflicting claims problems.
Introduction
A conflicting claims problem is a situation in which a divisible homogeneous good must be distributed among a group, each individual in the group having an objective claim on the good, but where the amount of the good is insufficient to satisfy all the claims. An example is dividing the liquidated value of a bankrupt firm among its creditors. How should the good be divided among the claimants? We seek a rule which chooses, for any problem, a feasible allocation or award. (A feasible award is one in which every individual receives an amount between 0 and his claim, and which completely exhausts the good to be divided.)
Overview of Results
We impose the axiom Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (henceforth IIA) on rules. This axiom states that if the chosen award for a problem is also feasible for a second problem whose feasible set is a subset of the original problem, then that award is also chosen for the second problem. This is the same axiom originally used by Nash (1950) in the domain of bargaining problems. In the context of individual choice, this axiom is sometimes known as Chernoff's condition (Chernoff, 1954) or Sen's a (Sen, 1969) .
We also impose two axioms that are common in the literature: Consistency and Resource Monotonicity. Consistency states that if a division rule chooses an award for a group of claimants, then it should not choose to reallocate the awards of any subgroup when considered as a separate problem. Resource Monotonicity states that if the amount to be divided increases, then no claimant's award should decrease.
Theorem 1 shows that IIA, Consistency, and Resource Monotonicity characterize a family of rules which can be described in three different but intuitive ways:
• Consider a fixed, weakly monotone path in the space of awards. For any group of claimants and any vector of claims for that group, the path of awards is simply the fixed path truncated by the claims vector. We refer to all such rules as monotone path rules.
• Consider a set of parametric functions, one for each individual. Each parametric function depends only on a single parameter, in which it is weakly increasing. For any problem, each parametric function is truncated by the individual's claim, and a common parameter is found so that the sum of the truncated parametric functions evaluated at that parameter equals the amount to be divided. We refer to all such rules as claims independent parametric rules.
• Consider an additively separable, strictly concave social welfare function. For any problem, the amount awarded is the maximizer of the social welfare function subject to the constraint of choosing a feasible award. We refer to all such rules as collectively rational additively separable (henceforth CRAS) rules.
We also consider a property which is dual to IIA. Rather than taking the awards as what matters to the individuals, as IIA does, this dual property takes the losses (the difference between an individuals claim and his award) as what matters. Theorem 2 shows that IIA and its dual are effectively incompatible: the queueing rule is the only rule to satisfy Consistency, Resource Monotonicity, IIA, and the dual of IIA.
If there is no a priori reason to treat the claimants differently, then one would want the rule to give the same award to individuals with the same claim, a property known as Symmetry. Theorem 3 shows that the constrained equal awards rule is the only rule in our family which satisfies Symmetry. Additionally, we consider the case where each individual has not just a claim on the good to be divided, but also some endowment which cannot be taken from him. In such a case, it may be reasonable to treat individuals with the same claim differently because of differing endowments.
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Figure 1: Path of awards. The path of awards is the set of all awards as the endowment varies from zero to the sum of claims.
Definitions
We adopt the following notation. Let N denote the set of finite subsets of the natural numbers, N. Let R + denote the non-negative real numbers, R ++ the positive real numbers, and R the extended real numbers. Let 0 denote a vector of zeros and Ω a vector in which all coordinates are +∞. For x, y ∈ R N , we use the vector inequalities x y if x i ≥ y i for all i ∈ N , x ≥ y if x y and x = y, and x > y if x i > y i for every i ∈ N . Also, let x ∧ y denote the meet of x and y, i.e. x ∧ y = (min{x i , y i }) i∈N . For N ⊂ N , let x N denote the projection of x onto the subspace R N . A claims problem is a tuple (N, c, E), where N ∈ N , c ∈ R N ++ , and E ∈ R + , all satisfying i∈N c i ≤ E. Let X(N, c, E) denote the set of efficient feasible awards vectors for the problem (N, c, E), i.e. X(N, c, E) ≡ x ∈ R N + : 0 x c and i∈N
A division rule is a function S such that for every problem (N, c, E), we have S(N, c, E) ∈ X(N, c, E).
Some well-known rules include the proportional rule, the constrained equal awards rule, the constrained equal losses rule, the Talmud rule (Aumann and Maschler, 1985) , and the queueing rule. The constrained equal awards and queueing rules are members of the family which we characterize, while the others are not.
A convenient way of graphically representing a rule is by the path of awards it generates. For a fixed N ∈ N and c ∈ R N ++ , the path of awards generated by S is the set of all awards S(N, c, E) as E varies from 0 to the sum of claims N c i . See Figure  1 . Thus a rule can be identified with a collection of paths, one for every N ∈ N and every c ∈ R N ++ .
Main Results
In this section we introduce the axioms imposed and the family of rules which are characterized by those axioms.
Axioms
We impose three axioms. The first states that increasing the amount to divide should not cause any claimant's award to decrease.
Resource Monotonicity. For every (N, c, E) and E < E, we have S(N, c, E ) ≤ S(N, c, E).
The next axiom states that how a rule divides between two claimants does not change if all other claimants are removed from the problem.
Bilateral Consistency. For every (N, c, E) and {i, j} ⊂ N , if x = S(N, c, E), then
A more general version of this axiom called Consistency holds for any N ⊂ N .
Our final axiom axiom is well-known and has been used in many other contexts. It states that if the solution to a problem is feasible for a different problem with a smaller feasible set, then it will be the solution to this second problem.
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. For every (N, c, E) and (N , c , E ), if X(N , c , E ) ⊂ X(N, c, E) and S(N, c, E) ∈ X(N , c , E ), then S(N , c , E ) = S(N, c, E).
We abbreviate the name to IIA. Given the structure here, it is easy to more precisely characterize the conditions of IIA. Given S and (N, c, E) , the set of all (N , c , E ) such that X(N , c , E ) ⊂ X(N, c, E) and S(N, c, E) ∈ X(N , c , E ) is precisely the set of all (N , c , E ) such that N = N , E = E, and S(N, c, E) c c. Thus IIA can alternatively be written as:
For every (N, c, E) and (N, c , E) satisfying S(N, c, E) c c, we have S(N, c , E) = S(N, c, E).
IIA is undoubtedly a strong assumption. In essence, it states that the division rule should assign allocations independently of the claims problem at hand. For example, suppose (N, c, E) and c satisfy the conditions of IIA. Suppose further that c j = c j for all j = i and that c i < c i . IIA says that since the division rule deemed x = S(N, c, E) a just allocation for the problem (N, c, E), then it must deem x a just allocation for (N, c , E). The fact that the claim of individual i decreased does not alter this assessment since x is still feasible for the problem (N, c , E).
Note that this argument takes for granted the idea that it is the awards that matter. Thus IIA would not be as compelling in applications where the award is actually a bad, e.g. fair taxation. (Taxation problems are formally identical to claims problems: c is interpreted as the vector of incomes, E is interpreted as the revenue that must be raised via taxation, and S(N, c, E) is the assignment of taxes.) We will return to this point in Section 4.
In the context of individual choice, IIA is considered to be a standard rationality assumption. Thus one can think of IIA as imposing some amount of "rationality" on the social choice function S. One may then wonder what the implications would be of assuming the stronger axiom WARP. Given the structure here, it is not difficult to show that IIA and WARP are in fact equivalent.
Monotone Path Rules
We describe here a family of rules defined from a monotone path.
For M ⊂ N and for x, y ∈ R M , a path from x to y is a continuous function
A path is weakly monotone if t > t implies p(t) p(t ). Let P denote the family of weakly monotone paths in R N + from 0 to Ω. Call p ∈ P a monotone path.
For a given p ∈ P, N ∈ N and c ∈ R N ++ , let p c denote the path from 0 to c obtained by taking, for every t, the meet of c and the projection of
See 
Hence for any p ∈ P, we can define a division rule S p as: where t is chosen such that i∈N p c i (t) = E. We say a rule S is a monotone path rule if there exists p ∈ P such that S = S p .
Claims Independent Parametric Rules
Let F denote the family of functions f :
is continuous, weakly increasing, and satisfies f (i, −∞) = 0 and f (i, +∞) = +∞. From now on we write f (i, ·) as f i . Note that for any N ∈ N and c ∈ R N ++ , the function i∈N min{f i (λ), c i } is continuous and weakly monotonic in λ, and that i∈N min{f i (−∞), c i } = 0 and i∈N min{f i (+∞), c i } = i∈N c i . Hence, for any claims problem (N, c, E), there exists λ ∈ R such that i∈N min{f i (λ), c i } = E. Furthermore, if λ and λ are such that i∈N min{f i (λ), c i } = i∈N min{f i (λ ), c i } = E, then it must be that min{f i (λ), c i } = min{f i (λ ), c i } for every i ∈ N . Hence for any f ∈ F, we can define a division rule S f as:
where λ is chosen such that i∈N min{f i (λ), c i } = E. We say a rule S is a claims independent parametric rule if there exists f ∈ F such that S = S f . See Figure 3 . The claims independent parametric rules are a special case of the (asymmetric) parametric rules characterized by Stovall (2013) . In that paper, a parametric function was a continuous function g : N × R ++ × R which was weakly increasing in the third argument and satisfying g i (c i , −∞) = 0, g i (c i , +∞) = c i . Thus the more general parametric functions depend not only on the parameter but also on the individual's claim. A division rule could be defined from such a function as was done above. Thus the parametric function g is a claims independent parametric function if for every i ∈ N, c i > 0, and λ ∈ R, there exists f ∈ F such that g i (c i , λ) = min{f i (λ), c i }.
As we show later in Theorem 1, monotone path rules and claims independent parametric rules are in fact the same family of rules. Indeed, this is easy to see now. For f ∈ F, define the monotone path
where g is any strictly increasing bijection from [0, 1] to R. Showing the converse is similar.
Collectively Rational Additively Separable Rules
A social welfare function (SWF) is a real-valued function of awards vectors. We say a SWF is additively separable if there exists U : N × R + → R such that for any N ∈ N and x ∈ R N + , the SWF can be written in the form i∈N U (i, x i ). Let U denote the family of functions U : N × R + → R that are continuous and strictly concave. From now on we write U (i, ·) as U i .
Note that for any U ∈ U, arg max x∈X(N,c,E) i∈N U i (x i ) is single-valued. Hence for any U ∈ U, we can define a division rule S U as:
We say a rule S is a collectively rational additively separable (CRAS) rule if there exists U ∈ U such that S = S U . The family of CRAS rules are similar to the family of rules characterized by Lensberg (1987) for the Nash bargaining problem.
1 Indeed, it is easy to see that any claims problem is also a Nash bargaining problem. However Lensberg's result does not imply ours as the class of Nash bargaining problems is much larger than the class of claims problems.
Theorem
Our main theorem states that these three axioms characterize each of these families of rules, and thus these families are in fact one and the same. 2. S is a monotone path rule.
3. S is a claims independent parametric rule.
S is a CRAS rule.
The proof is in the appendix (with all subsequent proofs).
We note a few things concerning this theorem. First, it shows the appeal of this family of rules as it can be described in three different but intuitive ways. Monotone path rules are geometrically appealing. Claims independent parametric rules are easy to relate to the family of parametric rules. CRAS rules are a natural method of division, one that has been proposed in many other social choice problems.
A second thing to note is that continuity of the rule is not assumed, though it is implied by the axioms. It is a well-known result that Resource Monotonicity implies continuity in the endowment, and this fact is used in the proof. The other part of continuity, that of continuity in the claims vector, is not needed in the proof (though obviously IIA would play a key role in establishing this property).
The following examples demonstrate that the axioms in Theorem 1 are independent.
• Bilateral Consistency. Let p, p ∈ P be two different monotone paths. Consider the rule which divides according to S p for all two-person claims problems and S p for all claims problems with more than two claimants. Such a rule would satisfy Resource Monotonicity and IIA but not Bilateral Consistency.
• IIA. The proportional rule
satisfies Bilateral Consistency and Resource Monotonicity, but not IIA.
• Resource Monotonicity. We sketch an example here, but a complete example is given in the appendix. Consider a rule for only two claimants. This rule divides according to a fixed path, which is not weakly monotone. Specifically, this path is always increasing in the first claimant's coordinate, but does sometimes decrease in the second claimant's coordinate. However it never has a slope less than −1, thus guaranteeing that it intersects with any endowment line only once. Given this fixed path, we now describe the path of awards for a given claims vector. For (c 1 , c 2 ) ∈ R 2 ++ , the path of awards is the intersection of the the fixed path with the rectangle defined by the origin and (c 1 , c 2 ). If the fixed path exits and then subsequently re-enters the rectangle, then the path of awards travels along the border of the rectangle from the point of exit to the point of entry. Once the fixed path leaves the rectangle permanently, the path of awards travels along the border of the rectangle from the point of exit to the point (c 1 , c 2 ). See Figure 4 . We have thus described the path of awards for any claims vector, and thus completely described the rule for two claimants. Such a rule satisfies IIA but obviously not Resource Monotonicity. In the appendix, we describe how this rule can be extended to any problem so as to satisfy Bilateral Consistency. 
Duality
An alternative way of viewing a claims problem is how to divide up the losses. Since the losses for the problem (N, c, E) is E − N c i , we define the dual of (N, c, E) as the problem (N, c, 
Note that for every (N, c, E), we have X(N, c, E) = L(N, c, N c i − E), which is to say that the set of feasible awards for a problem is equal to the set of feasible losses for the dual of that problem. The dual of the rule S is
Thus S d allocates losses the same way that S allocates gains, and vice versa. The dual of the axiom A is the axiom A d such that
One can show that the dual of Consistency is Consistency itself. Similarly, the dual of Resource Monotonicity is itself. This is not true of IIA.
Similar to IIA, we can more precisely characterize the conditions of this axiom. Namely, the conditions are met if N = N , c i − E = c i − E , and S(N, c, E) c c.
Thus IIA-Dual treats losses as what matters, and so would be more normatively appealing in applications in which the resource to be divided is actually a bad.
It is easy to see the implications of replacing IIA with IIA-Dual in Theorem 1. Namely, the result would be a rule which divides losses according to the monotone path rule. However what would be the result if IIA-Dual was added to the axioms in Theorem 1? Since the intuition behind IIA and IIA-Dual are somewhat incompatible, the result is a rule which is usually considered to be normatively unappealing.
The queueing rule divides the endowment by lining up the claimants in a queue and then awarding the first person in the queue his full claim, then the second person his full claim, and continuing until the endowment is exhausted. Let L denote the set of strict linear orders over N . For ∈ L, define the rule S as:
We say a rule S is a queueing rule if there exists ∈ L such that S = S .
Theorem 2 The rule S satisfies Resource Monotonicity, Bilateral Consistency, IIA, and IIA-Dual if and only if S is a queueing rule.
Symmetry
If there is no a priori reason to treat the claimants differently, then one would want the rule to give the same award to individuals with the same claim. This is captured in the following axiom.
Symmetry. For every problem (N, c, E) and {i, j} ∈ N , if c i = c j , then S i (N, c, E) = S j (N, c, E).
The constrained equal awards rule is the rule that gives everyone the same award, unless that award is more than a claimant's claim in which case that claimant gets his full claim:
where λ is chosen such that N CEA i (N, c, E) = E. It should be obvious that the constrained equal awards rule is a claims independent parametric rule and that it satisfies Symmetry. In fact it is the only claims independent parametric rule to satisfy Symmetry.
Theorem 3 The constrained equal awards rule is the only rule to satisfy Resource Monotonicity, Bilateral Consistency, IIA, and Symmetry.
The proof is straightforward given Theorem 1, and so is omitted. We note that adding IIA to the set of axioms in Young (1987, Theorem 1) would give the same result. Thus we could replace Resource Monotonicity with the assumption that S is continuous in Theorem 3 and the result would still hold.
Even if one thought the claimants should be treated equally, it may be the case that there is other information known about the claimants (other than their claims) that would cause one not to want to impose Symmetry. For example, suppose that each claimant had an endowment w i of the good which could not be taken from the claimant. Then one may want the rule to sometimes allocate less to individuals who have larger endowments.
We formalize this as follows. A problem is now a tuple (N, c, w, E), where N ∈ N , c ∈ R N ++ , w ∈ R N + , and E ∈ R + , all satisfying i∈N c i ≤ E. The variables N , c, and E are as before, but here w represents the vector of endowments, which doesn't put any additional constraint on the problem. Let X(N, c, w, E) denote the set of efficient awards vectors for the problem (N, c, w, E), i.e. X(N, c, w, E) ≡ x ∈ R N + : 0 x c and i∈N
A division rule is a function S such that for every problem (N, c, w, E), we have S(N, c, w, E) ∈ X(N, c, w, E).
Outcome Symmetry. For every problem (N, c, w, E) and {i, j} ∈ N , if c i +
Here, we think of the sum S i (N, c, w, E) + w i as being the outcome for individual i. Appropriate modifications of Bilateral Consistency, Resource Monotonicity, and IIA do not involve w, and are thus omitted.
The constrained equal outcomes rule gives everyone the same outcome, unless that outcome implies a claimant receives either a negative award or more than his claim, in which case that claimant receives either zero or his full claim respectively:
where λ is chosen such that N CEO i (N, c, w, E) = E. See Figure 5 Theorem 4 The constrained equal outcome rule is the only rule to satisfy Resource Monotonicity, Bilateral Consistency, IIA, and Outcome Symmetry. 
Appendix
Throughout the appendix, we shorten notation by writing the problem (N, c, E) as (c, E), as the group of claimants N is implicit in the claims vector c.
A Proof of Theorem 1
It is a straightforward exercise to show that each of these families of rules satisfies the axioms.
So we show that the axioms are sufficient to get each family of rules, i.e. we show that statement 1 implies 2, 3, and 4. Let S satisfy Bilateral Consistency, Resource Monotonicity, and IIA. It is straightforward to show that Resource Monotonicity implies the following continuity axiom.
Resource Continuity. For every (c, E), for every sequence (E k ) k∈N where
We follow the general proof strategy of Kaminski (2000 Kaminski ( , 2006 and Stovall (2013) by defining a binary relation over a suitable outcome space. The key step in the proof is showing that this binary relation has a numerical representation.
For i = j and x i , x j > 0, define:
Resource Continuity implies that we can replace inf with min. Note that we always have
and define the binary relation R 1 over Y as follows:
Note that if (i, x i )R 1 (j, x j ) and x j = 0, then it must be that x i = 0. Define the binary relation R 2 over Y as follows:
A.1 R Has a Numerical Representation
We show that R is complete, transitive, and that there exists a countable R-dense subset of Y . Thus, by Cantor's classic result, R has a numerical representation. By definition, it is obvious that R is complete. The following series of lemmas prove the other properties.
Lemma 1 Suppose i = j and
Thus for i = j and x i , x j > 0, (i, x i )P 1 (j, x j ) if and only if G(i, x i , j, x j ) < x i + x j .
Lemma 2 For every
We show that we must have y i +y k = G(k, x k , i, x i ) and y j +y k = G(k, x k , j, x j ). By way of contradiction, assume without loss of generality that y i + y k < G(k, x k , i, x i ). Then since y i +y j +y k = E it must be that y j +y k > G(k, x k , j, x j ). But then Bilateral Consistency and Resource Monotonicity would imply both y k < x k and y k = x k .
Since
Lemma 3 Suppose i = j, x i , x j > 0, and (j,
Proof. First consider the case when (c i , c j ) ≥ (x i , x j ). Then X((x i , x j ), E) ⊂ X((c i , c j ), E) for every E ≤ x i + x j . Also note that Lemma 1 implies E * ≤ x i + x j , which implies x * i ≤ x i . Note that for every E ≤ min{x i , x j }, we have X((x i , x j ), E ) = X((c i , c j ), E ), and so IIA implies S((x i , x j ), E ) = S((c i , c j ), E ). Thus if E * ≤ min{x i , x j }, then we are done since S((x i , x j ), E * ) = (x * i , x j ). So assume E * > min{x i , x j }. Note also that for every E < E * , we have S j ((x i , x j ), E ) < x j (by definition of E * ) and S i ((x i , x j ), E ) < x i (since (j, x j )R 1 (i, x i )). Thus for every E ≤ min{x i , x j } < E * , we have S j ((c i , c j ), E ) < x j and S i ((c i , c j ), E ) < x i .
So set E 1 ≡ min{x i , x j } and (y 
Again, if E n = E * for any n, then we are done. So we assume E n < E * for every n. Thus y n i < x i and y n j < x j . Now we show E n → E * . So suppose not, i.e. E n →Ê < E * . Then since E n < E * by assumption, we must have min{x i − y
But then by definition of E * and the fact that (j, x j )R 1 (i, x i ), we must haveÊ ≥ E * , which is a contradiction. Similarly, we get a contradiction if y
Now take any (c i , c j ) ≥ (x By Lemma 2, there exists E such that
So let x i = x k . We need to show that x i ≤ x i . By way of contradiction, suppose
So let
Similar to Case 3.
Proof. Let (i, x i )P (j, x j ). Then we must have x j > 0. (If x j = 0, then (j, x j )R(i, x i ) which contradicts (i, x i )P (j, x j ).) Case 1: i = j. Then x i < x j , so the result follows from the fact that Q is dense in R. Case 2: i = j and x i = 0.
Then for any x j ∈ (0, x j ), we must have (i, x i )P (j, x j )P (j, x j ). The result follows from Case 1 and transitivity. Case 3: i = j and
which implies x i > x i . Lemma 3 implies that S((x i , x j ), E ) = (x i , x j ). But as we already noted above S((x i , x j ), E * ) = (x i , x * j ), and since x i > x i , Resource Monotonicity implies that x * j ≥ x j , which is a contradiction. Hence it must be that (i, x i )R(j, x j ).
Hence R is complete, transitive, and there exists a countable R-dense subset of Y . Thus there exists r : Y → R such that
Note that for every i, r(i, ·) is strictly increasing.
Before continuing, we prove the following lemma, which will be useful in what follows.
Lemma 6 Fix (c, E) and set x ≡ S(c, E). Set λ * ≡ max i∈N {r(i, x i )}. Then for every i ∈ N where x i < c i ,
Proof. Obviously r(i, x i ) ≤ λ * . If r(i, x i ) = λ * , then the result obviously holds since r(i, ·) is strictly increasing. So suppose r(i, x i ) < λ * = r(j, x j ) for some j ∈ N such that j = i.
We show that for every x i ∈ (x i , c i ), we have λ * < r(i, x i ). By way of contradiction, suppose λ * = r(j, x j ) ≥ r(i, x i ). Since r(i, ·) is strictly increasing, we can assume r(j, x j ) > r(i, x i ) without loss of generality. Note that
. Since x i < x i and x j > x * j , this must violate Resource Monotonicity. Thus for x i ∈ (x i , c i ), we have λ * < r(i, x i ). Hence we must have λ
A.2 Claims Independent Parametric Rule
Here we show that S must be a claims independent parametric rule. For λ ∈ R, define
.
Since r(i, ·) is increasing, we have
Proof. Fix i ∈ N . First we show f i is weakly increasing. Let λ, λ ∈ R be given where λ < λ . If λ < r(i, 0), then f i (λ) = 0. Since the definition of f i implies f i (λ ) ≥ 0, we have
Next we show f i is continuous. Suppose f i were discontinuous. Then since f i is weakly increasing, there must exist x 0 ∈ R + such that x 0 is not in the image of f i . But this is a contradiction since λ = r(i, x 0 ) ∈ R and f i (λ) = x 0 by Lemma 7.
Finally we show f i (−∞) = 0 and f i (+∞) = +∞. Note that −∞ < r(i, 0). Hence f i (−∞) = 0 by definition of f i . Note that +∞ ≥ r(i, x i ) for every x i ∈ R + . Hence f i (+∞) = sup R + = +∞.
Proof. Fix (c, E) and set x ≡ S(c, E). Set λ * ≡ max i∈N {r(i,
since f i is weakly increasing. But then Lemma 7 and continuity of f i imply f i (λ * ) ≤ x i . We have thus established that for the case where x i < c i , we must have
A.3 Monotone Path Rule
Here we show that S must be a monotone path rule. Set
where g is any strictly increasing bijection from [0, 1] to R. for 0 ≤ t ≤ Lemma 10 p ∈ P.
Proof. Since g is a strictly increasing bijection from [0, 1] to R, we must have g(0) = −∞ and g(1) = +∞. Also, Lemma 8 establishes that f i (−∞) = 0 and f i (+∞) = +∞ for every i ∈ N. Hence p(0) = 0 and p(1) = Ω. Also, p must be weakly monotone and continuous since g is increasing and continuous and each f i is weakly increasing and continuous.
Proof. Follows from Lemma 9.
A.4 CRAS Rule
Here we show that S must be a CRAS rule.
Since r(i, a) is strictly increasing, it is Riemann integrable. Define
Proof. Fix i ∈ N. First we show U i is strictly concave. Fix x, x ∈ R + such that x < x . Fix α ∈ (0, 1). Setx ≡ αx + (1 − α)x . Note that
Hence, U i is strictly concave if and only if
But since x <x < x and since r(i, a) is strictly increasing, we have
which, inputting into the above equation, gives the result. The continuity of U i follows from the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus.
Lemma 13 Suppose i = j, x i , x j > 0 and (j,
Lemma 14 For every i ∈ N and x i ∈ R + , it is without loss of generality to assume
Proof. If x i = 0, then the only sequence in R + below 0 is the sequence of zeros. Hence lim x i ↑0 r(i, x i ) = r(i, 0).
So assume x i > 0. Since r(i, ·) is strictly increasing, we obviously have lim x i ↑x i r(i, x i ) ≤ r(i, x i ). By way of contradiction, suppose a ≡ lim x i ↑x i r(i, x i ) < r(i, x i ). Note that without loss of generality, we can assume that there exists (j, x j ) ∈ Y where j = i such that r(j, x j ) ∈ (a, r(i, x i )). (If no such (j, x j ) existed, then we could "cut out" the discontinuity at (i, x i ) without changing the ordering of r, and thus have a = r(i, x i ).) Then for every x i ∈ (0, x i ), we have r(i, x i ) < r(j, x j ) < r(i, x i ). But then (j, x j )P 1 (i, x i ), so Lemma 13 implies that r(j, x j ) < r(i, x i ) for every x i ∈ (G(j, x j , i, x i ) − x j , x i ), which is a contradiction.
Lemma 15 Fix (c, E) and set x ≡ S U (c, E). Suppose 0 < E < N c i . Then there exists λ * such that for every i ∈ N where x i < c i ,
Proof. Set C ≡ {y ∈ R N : 0 y c}. Note that x is the unique solution to the problem min y∈C i∈N
Also note that there exists y in the interior of C such that E = N y i and N −U i (y i ) is finite. Hence (Rockafellar, 1970, Corollary 28.2.2) , there exists λ * such that x is the solution to min y∈C i∈N
Thus for every i and
is strictly convex (by Lemma 12). Thus for every i where x i < c i , λ * is a subderivative of −U i (·) at x i . Thus by Lemma 14 and (Rockafellar, 1970, Theorem 24 .2), we have
Lemma 16 S = S U .
Proof. Fix (c, E) and set x ≡ S(c, E) and
for every i ∈ N where x i < c i . By Lemma 15, there exists λ U such that
for every i ∈ N where x U i < c i . By way of contradiction, suppose x = x U . Then there exists i ∈ N such that
But this is a contradiction since both equal E. If x i < x U i ≤ c i , then by similar reasoning we get a contradiction. Hence we must have x = x U .
B Example Violating Resource Monotonicity
Instead of describing the paths of awards for the rule as we did in Section 3, we will define a function that is almost parametric. This function will be parametric for every i ∈ N (meaning f i satisfies the conditions of a parametric function) except for i = 2, which will have f 2 not weakly increasing. Letf ∈ F satisfyf 1 (0) = +∞ andf i (0) = 0 for all i = 1. Thusf gives priority to claimant 1 over all the other claimants. Also assumef 1 is strictly increasing and concave on the interval (−∞, 0) (i.e.f 1 (λ) > 0 andf 1 (λ) ≥ 0) and thatf i is strictly increasing on the interval (0, +∞) for every i = 1. Define the function f fromf as follows: f i =f i for every i = 2. For i = 2, let
for some fixed a, b, and satisfying −∞ < a < b < 0, 0 < < f 1 (a), and b−a < f 1 (a). Thus we have the following: f 2 (−∞) = 0, f 2 (0) = +∞, and f 1 + f 2 is strictly increasing on the interval (−∞, 0). For N ∈ N where either 1, 2 ∈ N or 2 ∈ N , and for any c ∈ R N ++ , the function i∈N min{f i (λ), c i } is continuous and increasing in λ, and that i∈N min{f i (−∞), c i } = 0 and i∈N min{f i (+∞), c i } = i∈N c i . Hence, for any E satisfying 0 ≤ E ≤ c i , there exists λ ∈ R such that i∈N min{f i (λ), c i } = E. Furthermore, if λ and λ are such that i∈N min{f i (λ), c i } = i∈N min{f i (λ ), c i } = E, then it must be that min{f i (λ), c i } = min{f i (λ ), c i } for every i ∈ N .
For N ∈ N where 2 ∈ N and 1 ∈ N , and for c ∈ R N ++ , the function i∈N min{f i (λ), c i } is continuous and satisfies i∈N min{f i (−∞), c i } = 0 and i∈N min{f i (+∞), c i } = i∈N c i . Hence, for any E satisfying 0 ≤ E ≤ c i , there exists λ ∈ R such that i∈N min{f i (λ), c i } = E. However note that i∈N min{f i (λ), c i } may not be increasing. However here it does not matter because individual 2 is given priority over every individual i = 1. Thus as before, if λ and λ are such that i∈N min{f i (λ), c i } = i∈N min{f i (λ ), c i } = E, then it must be that min{f i (λ), c i } = min{f i (λ ), c i } for every i ∈ N .
So we can define a division rule S f as:
where λ is chosen such that i∈N min{f i (λ), c i } = E. Obviously S f does not satisfy Resource Monotonicity. To see that S f satisfies Consistency, let (N, c, E) and N ⊂ N be given. Set x = S(N, c, E). Then there exists λ such that x i = min{f i (λ), c i } for every i ∈ N . But then λ also satisfies N min{f i (λ), 
C Proof of Theorem 2
Let S satisfy Bilateral Consistency, Resource Monotonicity, IIA, and IIA-Dual.
Define the binary relation over N as follows: i j if i = j and there exists (c i , c j ) ∈ R {i,j} ++ such that S i ((c i , c j ) , c i ) = c i . The following lemmas demonstrate that is a strict linear order over N.
Lemma 17 It is never the case that for N = {i, j} ⊂ N, c ∈ R {i,j} ++ , and E ∈ (0, c i + c j ), that we have 0 < S(c, E) < c.
Proof. By way of contradiction, suppose there exists N = {i, j} ⊂ N, c ∈ R {i,j} ++ , and E ∈ (0, c i + c j ) such that 0 < S(c, E) < c. Without loss of generality, assume c i ≤ c j . There exists > 0 such that 2 < S i (c, E) < c i − 2 . Set c ≡ (c i − , c j + ). Note that for E ≤ c j , we have X(c , E) ⊂ X(c, E) and S(c, E) ∈ X(c , E). Thus IIA implies S(c, E) = S(c , E). Similarly, for E ≥ c i , we have L(c , E) ⊂ L(c, E) and c − S(c, E) ∈ L(c , E). Thus IIA implies c − S(c, E) = c − S(c , E).
Suppose E ∈ [c i , c j ]. Then we have S(c, E) = S(c , E) and c − S(c, E) = c − S(c , E). But this implies c = c , which is a contradiction.
Suppose E > c j . Then we have c−S(c, E) = c −S(c , E), which implies S(c, E) = c − c + S(c , E) = S(c , E) + ( , − ). Thus S(c, E) ∈ X(c , E) and S(c , E) ∈ X(c, E). Consider the claim c = (c i , c j + ). Note that X(c, E) ⊂ X(c , E) and X(c , E) ⊂ X(c , E) and either S(c , E) ∈ X(c, E) or S(c , E) ∈ X(c , E). If S(c , E) ∈ X(c, E), then IIA implies S(c , E) = S(c, E). But since S(c, E) ∈ X(c , E), IIA implies S(c , E) = S(c , E). Thus S(c, E) = S(c , E). But then we get c = c which is a contradiction. Similarly, we get a contradiction if S(c , E) ∈ X(c , E).
Similarly, if E < c i , we get a contradiction. But that exhausts all possible values of E.
Lemma 18 For every {i, j} ⊂ N, either i j or j i, but not both.
Proof. Fix {i, j} ⊂ N. Lemma 17 implies that either i j or j i. We now show that both cannot be true. By way of contradiction, suppose both i j and j i. Thus there exists (c i , c j ) ∈ R {i,j} ++ and (c i , c j ) ∈ R {i,j} ++ such that S((c i , c j ), c i ) = (c i , 0) and S((c i , c j ), c j ) = (0, c j ). But then Lemma 3 implies that both S((c i , c j ), c i ) = (c i , 0) and S((c i , c j ), c j ) = (0, c j ), which must contradict Resource Monotonicity.
Lemma 19
is transitive.
